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distinguished from the power of revocation. Seemingly, a tentative trust is subject to the absolute control of the depositor which would result in there being no
trust. Actually, however, the depositor does not have a power of direct control
over the res but only a power to revoke in part or in whole." The existence of a
power to revoke does not prevent the creation of a present existing trust, and the
power of revocation, until exercised, has no effect upon the trust.
Thus, it is seen that the tentative trust is a conveient method of disposing
of money. The requirements of the laws of testamentary disposition, gifts, and
trusts do not have to be complied with to secure execution of the depositor s intent. The will involves the formality of execution and the expense of administration and probate. The gift inter vivos requires the party to deliver and surrender
control of the property The gift once executed cannot be recalled. The trust requires the separation of legal and beneficial interest, and to guarantee validity,
the settlor can retain only limited control. Even the power of revocation has to
be clearly reserved to exist, for if an irrevocable trust is created the settlor cannot recall. The tentative trust is not bound by any of these restrictions. The
only requirement is for the deposit to be made so as to raise the tentative trust.
The depositor retains the power to revoke to such an extent that he actually has
control of the property. He can make any use of the deposit he desires, raising or
lowering the amount at will. No particular formalities are required in revoking
where the intent to revoke appears. 3 Kentucky, in accepting the tentative trust,
has recogmzed a method of disposing of money that permits the donor to retain
control over the money.
DEMPSEY A. Cox

HUGHETT v. CALDWELL COUNTY- MEASURE OF
DAMAGES FOR JNNOCENT CONVERSION OF MINERALS
In the recent Kentucky case of Hughett v. CaldwelU a mineral lease of an
abandoned right of way was executed to the defendants. The defendants did not
begin mimng operations until the title to the strip had been determined by the
circuit court to be in Caldwell County, the lessor. Later, after the defendants
had mined and sold a considerable quantity of fluorspar, the Court of Appeals
held that title to the stnp was in the plaintiffs.- Suit was then brought by the
plaintiffs to recover the value of the fluorspar which the defendants, as innocent
trespassers, had removed. The trial court, following the rule laid down by prior
decisions of the Court of Appeals, allowed the plaintiffs to recover only the reasonable and customary royalty for the pnvilege of mining. On appeal the upper
court expressly overruled its former decisions3 and held that the correct measure
' Ibid.
' 1 ScoTT, TRusTs 362 (1939); RESTATEMENT, TnusTs sec. 58 (1935). Evidently, the court construed the check drawn by the depositor on the account as a
revocation pro tanto. The nature and validity of the instrument may be subject to
question but a revocation in some manner is a requirement of the decision.
1313 Ky. 85, 230 S.W 2d 92 (1950).
Hughett v. Caldwell County, 288 Ky. 89, 155 S.W 2d 481 (1941).
Falls Branch Coal Co. v. Proctor Coal Co., 203 Ky. 307, 262 S.W 300
(1924); Bennett Jellico Coal Co. v. East Jellico Coal Co., 152 Ky. 838, 154 S.W
922 (1913).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
of damages in this case was "the reasonable market value of the fluorspar after it
was mined less the reasonable cost incurred by the defendants in mining."4
When coal or other minerals are appropriated by an innocent trespasser
the landowner can recover from him the value of the minerals in place. This
rule itself is a relatively simple one, which is universally followed.' The only difficulty is in determining the value of the minerals in place. The courts have used
two tests in establishing this value: (1) the value of the minerals at the mouth
of the mine less the reasonable expense incurred in mining them; (2) the royalty
value, i.e., the amount for which the landowner could sell the privilege of mining
or removing the mineral. The first test is followed by the majority of courts.'
Kentucky followed the second test for years, holding that the measure of damages
for an innocent conversion of minerals was the usual or reasonable royalty paid
for the right to mine it. The practical effect of this test is to allow the wrongdoer
the expense of extracting the minerals plus the profits resulting from the conversion.
It seems an anomaly in the law to allow a wrongdoer, even though acting in
good faith, to profit from his own wrong.'
The decision in the Hughett case changed the test in Kentucky for determimng
damages for the innocent conversion of minerals, at least in those cases where
the owner is in a position to mine the minerals himself. In this case it appears that
the plaintiffs were engaged in mimng operations on adjacent land. The court
indicated that in future cases it will continue to use the "royalty" test unless the
landowner is in a position to remove the minerals himself within a reasonable time.
In its opimon the court stated:
"
where minerals have been innocently extracted and
sold, the question in each case is whether in the circumstances royalty
or the net market value of the mined mineral is the just and due
compensation. Where the owner could not extract the mineral himself in any practical or feasible way, or where he is merely holding
his property for development in the unforseeable future
the
value is as it lay in the ground. All he could expect to receive is the

'313 Ky. at 92, 230 S.W at 97.
FGuffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1914); Warrior Coal & Coke Co. v. Mabel
Mimng Co., 112 Ala. 624.20 So. 918 (1896); Ward v. Spadra Coal Co., 168 Ark.
853, 272 S.W 353 (1925); Dolch v. Ramsey, 57 Cal. App. 2d 99, 134 Pac. 2d 19
(1948); Liberty Bell Gold Mimng Co. v. Moorhead Mimng & Milling Co., 58 Colo.
308, 145 Pac. 686 (1915); McCoRMicK, DAMAGES sec. 126 (1935); 3 SEDGwICK,
DAMAGES sec. 935 (9th ed. 1920).
'Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1935); Dolch v. Ramsey, 57 Cal. App. 2d
99, 134 Pac. 2d 19 (1943); Liberty Bell Gold Mimng Co. v. Moorhead Mimng &
Milling Co. 58 Colo. 308, 145 Pac. 686 (1915); Cypress Creek Coal Co. v. Boonvile Coal Co., 194 Ind. 187, 142 N.E. 645 (1924); Hartford Iron Mimng Co. v.
Cambria Mining Co., 93 Mich. 90, 53 N.W 4 (1892); Fitzgerald v. Clark, 17
Mont. 100, 42 Pac. 273 (1895); Dougherty v. Chestnut, 86 Tenn. 1, 5 S.W 444
(1887); Pan Coal Co. v. Garland Pocahontas Coal Co., 97 W Va. 368, 125 S.E.
226 (1924); McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES sec. 126 (1935); 3 SEDGwICK, DAMAGES sec.
935 9th ed. 1920). See also 7 A.L.R. 908.
See note 3 supra.
'Cf. the doctrine of accession of converted chattels under which an innocent
trespasser is permitted to acquire title to the converted chattel where its value has
been increased, and is liable only for the value of the chattel at the time of its
conversion. Actually the innocent converter does not profit from his own wrong
doing at the owners expense, since .the owner recovers the amount of his actual
damages. See BROWN, PmRSONAL PRoPERTY sees. 24, 25 (1936).

238

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

usual and customary royalty Moreover that is about the only available proof of value. But under other conditions where it is practical
to establish their value at the mouth of the mine or pit, that is the
measure of his pecumary loss, and that should be his compensation."
Obviously, the court intended to distinguish between a case where the owner
is in a position to remove the minerals himself and one in which he is not. Apparently the court intended to limit the effect of its decision to cases where the
owner is in a position to mine the minerals himself.
The result in the instant case is desirable and just, but it is submitted that
the court should have availed itself of this opportunity to extend the rule applied
in this case to all cases of innocent conversion of minerals, rather than limit it to
smmilar fact situations. It is difficult to see why the distinction should be made.
Whether a landowner whose minerals have been converted by a trespasseer is in
a position to mine them himself, or has no present feasible way of mimng them
should make no difference. In either case he has been damaged to the same
extent - he has been deprived of the right to receive the profits from his minerals.
In either case the converter is a wrongdoer of the same nature. Why should he
be permitted to retain the profits from his own wrongful acts to the detriment of
the one wronged simply because the landowner is in no position to remove his
own minerals? It is submitted that this violates well established legal pnnciples;
that onginally the "royalty" test for ascertaining damages for the innocent conversion of minerals was based on reasons of expediency rather than justice; that
justice, not expediency, should be the controlling factor; and that m all cases of
conversion of minerals, justice can be done only by giving to the owner the profits
from the minerals. It is hoped that when an appropriate case arises the Kentucky
Court will go the whole way and apply the test for fixing damages used m this
case to all conversions of minerals by innocent trespass, regardless of whether
or not the owner is in a position to mine the minerals himself.
ARL E W

'813 Ky. at 92; 230 S.W 2d at 96.
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